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1 Introduction
Since the announcement of an ‘Adaptation Pilot’
as part of the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs),
the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
(PPCR), has been dogged by criticism and
continues to attract critique on both
international and national scales. The contention
around the role of the World Bank and
multilateral development banks (MDBs) in
climate finance, the use of loans and the
modalities of the PPCR governance and delivery
structures are framed by ongoing negotiations
under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), on
adaptation finance. Despite the criticisms and
ongoing tension however, the funding is
welcomed in many of the participating countries
and aspects of the PPCR and the wider CIFs
have gathered support among academics, civil
society organisations (CSOs), donors and
developing country governments.
Approved in November 2008, the PPCR was the
first operational programme under the Strategic
Climate Fund (SCF) – one of two key
programmes in the CIFs held by the World Bank
(the other being the Clean Technology Fund).
The CIFs were created to ‘bridge the financing
and learning gap’ prior to agreements on post-
Kyoto financing (Tan 2008). They are currently
funded by 12 countries, of which eight have
pledged a total of US$972 million to the PPCR.
PPCR funds are made up in the majority as
grant funding, but with concessional loan funds
from the UK’s International Environmental
Transformation Fund (IETF) – the single
biggest contribution being US$358 million
(Table 1).
Funds, in the form of grants and loans, are
intended to blend with existing development
funds to enhance resilience, but are also
available to fund technical assistance. The
technical assistance element is primarily aimed
at improving the country-level capacity necessary
to achieve the overarching transformative goal of
the PPCR – mainstreaming adaptation into
development planning. Central to the design and
investment programmes of the PPCR is the
provision of funds to cover the ‘add-on’ costs to
development programmes, thereby providing the
incentive to achieve ‘climate resilient
development’. However, the programme contains
a sunset clause, which means it is subject to
closure on the arrival of new UNFCCC post-2012
finance architecture.
Towards an Understanding of the
Political Economy of the PPCR
Fran Seballos and Sönke Kreft*
Abstract While an analysis of the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) is inseparable from wider
discussion on adaptation finance, this article primarily focuses on the drivers and ideologies that shaped the
PPCR governance and delivery structures. The core narrative of mainstreaming adaptation into development
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the standard economic growth narrative. This climate ‘add-on’ approach to development allows the World
Bank Group and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) to claim a space in managing future climate
finance flows. This drive by the Bank plays out in the exclusivity of the design process for the PPCR and
through the implementation modalities, which severely curtail opportunities for multi-stakeholder dialogue and
thus the potential for development of broad country ownership of programmes.
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This article explores the political economy of the
PPCR at the international level from
conceptualisation to implementation. While it
touches on many of the issues raised over the past
three years, it primarily seeks to address a gap in
understanding of both the drivers and ideologies
that frame the PPCR at the international level
and which inform its operation. The article
provides a framing analysis within which country
case studies can be situated (see Shankland and
Chambote; Ayers et al.; Alam et al., all in this IDS
Bulletin) as well as drawing out lessons to inform
the debates on climate finance in the near future.
Research for the article draws on interviews with
key actors engaged in the PPCR process,
including representatives from the World Bank,
donors, the expert group and observer
organisations. Primary data was combined with
reviews of the programme documentation and a
review of relevant wider literature.
2 Ideological drivers of the PPCR – meeting
whose agenda?
2.1 Governments and growth
The PPCR emerged from a political
understanding of the urgency to expedite climate
action expressed by leading donors in the G8.
The three-year Gleneagles Plan of Action on
Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable
Development of 2005 explicitly requests the
World Bank and other MDBs to engage in
financing the transition to clean energy and to
develop and implement climate risk
management for their and others’ development
investment portfolios (G8 2005). The G8
communiqués in Gleneagles (2005), St
Petersburg (2006) and Heiligendamm (2007)
featured elements of climate policy, albeit
heavily dominated by mitigation issues.
Mitigation and emissions reduction was at the
heart of donor attention – as reflected by expert
insights and the general level of donor money
apportioned to different parts of the CIFs1 – and
this was reflected in the design process. The
CIF’s focus on mitigation, rather than
adaptation activities in developing countries, can
be seen as a reflection of the G8 countries’
national interest.
Despite this domination, a number of key
underlying ideologies also framed the PPCR and
informed its institutional set-up. At the core of the
PPCR is the notion that adaptation and
development are closely interrelated processes,
where general ‘good’ development progress helps
increase the capacity to adapt to climate change
and reduce vulnerability to its impacts (Stern
2007). Climate change is regarded as an
instrumental threat to the achievement of
development objectives and the PPCR seeks to be
‘transformational’ in its policy reform agenda,
which in turn aims to internalise the challenge of
climate change in development planning. With
this approach, PPCR funds can be legitimately
channelled to existing development programmes
in an attempt to manage any negative climate
impacts on donor investments without challenging
the basic trajectory of economic growth embodied
in standard development practice (Paterson 2009).
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Table 1 Pledges to PPCR as of September 2010 
PPCR donor Type Pledge in US$ million
Australia Grant 39
Canada Grant 84
Demark Grant 14
Germany Grant 68
Japan Grant 111
Norway Grant 8
UK Capital 358
USA Grant 290
Total 972
Source CIF (2010).
Approaches to mainstreaming adaptation which
clearly play out in the PPCR context reflect a
donor-led conceptualisation that promotes
mainstreaming through embedding adaptation
in government development planning processes
and through ‘Encouraging a ministry with a
broad mandate, such as planning or finance, to
be fully involved in mainstreaming adaptation’
(AfDB 2003: XI). The targeting of developing
country finance and planning ministries – who
commonly had little or no prior engagement with
climate change – is a key strategy in the PPCR’s
policy reform agenda. In its vision of
transformation, the PPCR seeks to develop the
institutional capacity for longer-term ‘climate
resilient development’ through what can be seen
as a government-centred process. This ‘whole
government’ approach is articulated in the
recent OECD policy guidance on integrating
adaptation into development cooperation
(OECD 2009). However, the central focus on
government actors may miss a wide range of
sectoral and local knowledge and expertise at the
country level.
2.2 Reputation and responsibility
The mainstreaming approach underpins the
dedication of a new multilateral ‘adaptation’
fund with an institutional set-up offering a
comparative advantage in development catalysis
for this purpose. Although converging drivers
support the need for mainstreaming adaptation
into development, multiple drivers identified by
Gupta (2009: 209) include the potential that ‘the
governments of the leading economies are seeing
the need to converge the two debates as a way to
make their meagre resources go a longer way’.
The potential that focusing on mainstreaming as
a predominant adaptation activity could be a way
for developed countries to bypass obligations of
the UNFCCC is refuted by Ayers and Huq
(2008), who stress that ‘while there is clearly a
role for development institutions in enhancing
adaptive capacity, responsibility for adaptation
does not lie with these institutions’.
Responsibility for adaptation funding is
articulated through the principle of historical
and differentiated responsibility explicit in the
UNFCCC agreements, which provides for new
and additional adaptation funding to be made
available by developed countries.
Much of the political controversy around the
CIFs as a whole, but the PPCR in particular,
centres on the use of the World Bank and MDBs
as a channel for climate finance as opposed to
UN-based funds (see Bretton Woods 2008; Dahle
Huse 2008; Tan 2008; Marston 2010; Müller
2010). The World Bank and the MDBs,
predominantly lending institutions, are
associated with being a vehicle for developed
country interests,2 and contrast starkly with the
governance structure of the Adaptation Fund
established by the Kyoto Protocol which placed a
developing country majority on the Adaptation
Fund Board (AFB) after years of contention (see
Harmeling and Kaloga, this IDS Bulletin).
In addition, the track record and future of the
World Bank and MDB portfolio in contributing
to environmental degradation and climate
change through unsustainable development
pathways has been a central factor in the
ongoing debate. This notion of inappropriate
investment from the World Bank Group was, and
still is, central to a number of arguments from
the South and from global civil society (see
Dahle Huse 2008; Tan 2008; IBON International
2009; Müller and Winkler 2008) but has also
been recognised by donors. Some see the
establishment of the CIF as a response to this
critique and a positive step towards greening the
MDB portfolio and correcting its emission
driving and maladaptive investments. This was
also the reason cited for why the US senate and
congress did not approve the first appropriation
for the CIF in 2009.3
3 Negotiating the PPCR – degrees of
engagement?
3.1 Room for review
In early 2008, leaders from the UK, the USA and
Japan announced their intention to ‘establish a
multibillion-dollar fund…’ that ‘… will boost the
World Bank’s ability to help developing countries
tackle climate change’ (Paulson et al. 2008).
Following early discussions with the three leading
donors and the regional development banks, a
‘zero draft’ document for the CIFs was prepared
by the Bank (World Bank 2008a). The draft was
strongly framed by a concept of transformation,
proposing two core mitigation funds, an
adaptation pilot and the potential for further
transformative funds to ‘provide concessional
finance for policy reforms and investments that
achieve development goals through a transition
to a low carbon development path and climate
resilient economy’.
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The consultation draft was to form the basis for
consultation with wider ‘interested parties’
identified as potential donors, the private sector
and the pre-designated implementing agencies
(MDBs and World Bank Group) who were
targeted to engage in a six-month process for
designing, approving and launching the funds.
The article, leaked towards the end of January
2008, created a tidal wave of criticism captured
by Müller and Winkler (2008), who described the
PPCR as ‘… an unnecessary proliferation of
adaptation funds under a governance structure
wholly unacceptable to the large majority of
countries in the world’.
The specific criticisms of the PPCR reflected
heavily on the notion of equity, transparency and
access in managing and delivering climate funds
as advocated by civil society (see ActionAid 2007)
and developing countries through the UNFCCC
(see Harmeling and Kaloga, this IDS Bulletin).
The zero draft had not included modalities for
developing country representation in decision-
making, which was widely condemned by civil
society and academia (Müller and Winkler
2008), as well as important donors involved in
the process4 and corrected thereafter. Other
central critiques focused on:
z The role of loans in potentially increasing the
debt burden of vulnerable countries;
z The potential for an ‘Adaptation Pilot’ to
undermine the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund;
z The lack of harmonisation with existing
climate change initiatives at country level;
z The dominance of the World Bank Group
(WBG) in the design process and proposed
implementation modalities;
z The weak engagement with civil society and
other actors.
The dissent led to a series of changes in the
proposal for an ‘Adaptation Pilot Fund’ that were
embodied in the 25 March 2008 discussion draft
for the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience,
which emerged from the 4–5 March donor
meeting in Paris (World Bank 2008b).
Formal statements issued from the climate
negotiations in Bangkok, April 2008, from the
G77 (Group of 77/China 2008) and a letter
signed by both Southern and Northern NGOs
(Third World Network et al. 2008), contributed to
the critique of the proposed modalities and the
exclusive design process. Finally, a wider meeting
of 40 civil society, developing country and donor
representatives was convened in Potsdam,
Germany in May 2008. This meeting, cast by the
World Bank interviewee as the ‘core meeting for
PPCR formulation’, approved the modified PPCR
as a channel for funds to mainstream adaptation
into development programmes. The funds were
formally announced at the G8 meeting in
Hokkaido, Japan in July 2008.
3.2 Cause for concern
Criticism remains around the speed at which the
funds were negotiated and established and the
lack of opportunity for influential engagement
with civil society, particularly those from the
global South. However, a set of key controversial
proposals remained unchanged in the design of
the PPCR. Key among these relates to the
implementation elements of the PPCR, which
were tied into MDB delivery structures from the
outset. The use of implementation intermediaries
not only goes against calls for direct access to
climate finance, both for countries and civil
society, but raised three significant concerns:
z The potential for implementing agencies to
direct the use of the funds in ways which
benefit their own institutions;
z The opportunities for conditions to be imposed
through interventions in national policy;
z The potential for undermining national
ownership of the PPCR process (Dahle Huse
2008).
In addition, the inclusion of a sunset clause into
the PPCR may create an imperative to spend
within a given timeframe, potentially favouring
programmes and projects where vested interests
lie (see UNDP 2010) – as much a risk for
country-led processes as for intermediaries.
A second set of issues focused on the targeting of a
new set of players in climate finance and adaptation
planning at country level, adding to the controversy
around the development of new processes outside
the UNFCCC structures. UNFCCC-led adaptation
processes in developing countries, including the
implementation of National Adaptation
Programmes of Action (NAPAs), are usually
pursued by line-ministries responsible for UNFCCC
matters, often the Ministry of Environment,
although these are viewed by some as being a
bottle-neck to achieve transformational change
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(Fankhäuser and Schmidt-Traub 2010). The PPCR
advocates mainstreaming through ministries of
finance and planning, who are often new national
players in adaptation activities with little or no
capacity for climate change planning, with poor
understanding of the baseline of existing climate
change adaptation activities and not acquainted
with the principles and modalities of the UNFCCC.
The focus on a delivery relationship with these
ministries ignores the historic foci of climate change
activity at government level, missing the
opportunity to build on existing expertise and plans.
From the perspective of the PPCR programme,
the need to build capacity in these ministries is
central to the policy reform agenda required to
enable the transformative process of
mainstreaming adaptation into development
planning and policy. However, in some developing
countries, the aim to work with new actors opens
up rifts at the national level – equal to those
internationally – with the need, challenged by
some, to delineate between adaptation and
‘climate resilient development’ (see Alam et al.;
Ayers et al., both in this IDS Bulletin).
Centring climate finance delivery in structures
outside the country architecture retains power in
spaces beyond the influence of the country
government and civil society actors. This may
shape country level planning and prioritisation to
deliver concepts and ideas that are articulated at
the global level, without effectively taking into
account the local specificities, expertise or
existing operational modes (see Tanner and
Allouche, this IDS Bulletin).
4 Implementation implications – rolling out the
PPCR
4.1 Dynamics of decision-making
The ‘organisational meeting’ of the PPCR sub-
committee in October 2008 was composed of
representatives from four donor countries, five
developing countries, the AFB and international
financial institutions (IFIs). The selection
process of the early developing country
representatives on the sub-committee exclusively
involved consultation between World Bank
executive directors and MDB representatives. As
four out of five countries selected via this closed
process were invited to participate as pilot
countries in the PPCR, the nature of the
identification and selection of the invited
countries was brought sharply into question.
However, interviews indicate that in practice, the
selection of recipient countries holds little real
controversy. The identification process is widely
recognised as a top-down, science-driven process
rather than more demand-led; a process which
itself may not lead to prioritisation (see Klein
and Möhner; Harmeling and Kaloga, both in this
IDS Bulletin). An expert group was tasked with
identifying countries based on those eligible for
official development assistance (according to
OECD/DAC guidelines) and who have active
MDB lending programmes or are in dialogue
with the MDB (CIF 2008). It was indicated that
priority was to go to the highly vulnerable least
developed countries, and small island developing
states (SIDS). They also consider the following
core issues:
z Vulnerability criteria (to climate risk);
z Preparedness and ability to move toward
climate resilient development plans;
z Distribution across the regions and hazard
types.
The expert group grounded its selection process
in the first and third elements, focusing on
vulnerability and distribution spatially (according
to World Bank-defined regions) and by hazard in
order to support the PPCR mandate for lesson
learning to scale-up future investments.
According to interview respondents, despite the
mandate of the PPCR sub-committee,
management and liaison with the expert group
was led by the World Bank and the MDBs, with
little or no direct communication with the sub-
committee. In practice, the final selection
process primarily followed the recommendations
of the expert group except in four key areas:
(1) the replacement of Mauritania with Yemen;
(2) the dissolution of South-east Asia as a region
and the resultant selection of Cambodia only;
(3) the inclusion of Mozambique, and (4) changes
to the country selection within the Caribbean
and South Pacific regional programmes.
Changes were primarily driven by the World
Bank and MDBs and are deemed to have been
related to the lack of capacity for MDB
operations in Mauritania, a need to represent
the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, which embraced Yemen, and the
recognition of the need for greater Africa
representation leading to the subsequent review
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of least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa
and the inclusion of Mozambique. Evidence from
key actors suggests that Yemen, already on the
sub-committee, used their position to lobby for
selection as representative of the MENA region,
while donor agency country staff in Mozambique
lobbied internally for inclusion, which led to the
review of the African LDCs (see Shankland and
Chambote, this IDS Bulletin). Final country and
regional selections for PPCR programming are
shown in Table 2.
Once selected, the representation of developing
countries on the sub-committee was changed to
align with the recipient countries. However,
there remains a wider concern from developing
countries over lack of equity in the governance
structures, with recipient country
representatives constrained by the pre-existing
PPCR modalities of operation. Although the
‘active’ observer role at international level is
seen as progressive in terms of transparency and
accountability, this concern for improved equity
extends to a call for an active civil society role in
decision-making. Despite amended governance
structures, research for this article suggests that
the PPCR is still perceived as top-down in its
delivery.
4.2 Conditionality and capture
In the early stages of negotiation many actors
raised concerns around the potential for attaching
(political) conditionalities to the PPCR but to
date, these concerns are unfounded. Although in
some areas the policy reform agenda has been
construed as conditional, many countries have
channelled PPCR capacity funds towards
strengthening existing or emerging structures.
However, there remain a number of areas where
the opportunity for donor and implementing
agency influence and rent-seeking still remains
controversial. The greatest concern centres on the
role of the MDBs as implementers and the
potential for driving implementation of the PPCR
towards their existing programmes. The PPCR
mission guidelines issued to MDBs (CIF 2009)
gives the MDBs, at a minimum, equal stature with
the PPCR country governments. In many cases,
although certainly not all (for Nepal see Ayers et
al., this IDS Bulletin) a lack of country level
capacity has meant that the national government
appoints the MDB as de facto leader of the process.
While the guidelines for missions and Phase I
delivery refer to engagement with civil society
and NGOs, the emphasis is on dialogue with
other climate finance donors/development
partners and UN agencies to identify and
promote the necessary opportunities for co-
finance during Phase II. The rapid planning
process – Phase I was to be completed within 18
months – prioritised partnerships between
recipient country governments and external
agencies. This focus on external engagement and
leadership seriously challenges the conception of
the PPCR as an inclusive ‘country-driven’
process, instead sidelining the role and voice of
civil society and other expert actors in the
planning and delivery process. Interviews for this
article suggest that the role of CSOs and
affected stakeholders is limited to contributing
knowledge and engaging in strategic areas of
focus (e.g. awareness raising). This arms-length
approach to stakeholder ownership at the
country level means CSOs have little access to
decision-making processes and vulnerable groups
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Table 2 Final country and regional selections for PPCR programming
Countries Regions
Caribbean South Pacific
Bangladesh Dominica Samoa
Bolivia Grenada Tonga
Cambodia Haiti Papua New Guinea
Mozambique Jamaica
Nepal Saint Lucia
Niger Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Tajikistan
Yemen
Zambia
Source www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/ppcr (accessed 29 March 2011).
are rendered objects rather than citizens in a
change process.5
Finally, the modalities of the PPCR, which means
that funds are disbursed through the IFIs, means
that a proportion of the available money is
diverted to cover costs incurred in the
management of the project cycle (CIF July 2009).
While reports suggested a proposed ‘fee of
$350,000 be charged for each investment project…
approximately 40% more than the standard MDB
project fee’ (Marston 2010: 1), the PPCR sub-
committee have now agreed to approve costs on a
programme-by-programme basis (CIF Nov 2010).
Such proposals, emerging during the
implementation phase, underpin and reinforce the
controversy that donors have chosen to disburse
their funds through the World Bank and MDBs.
The non-negotiable channelling of PPCR funds
through MDBs implies a driving rationale and logic
for a World Bank Group role in climate finance.
5 Conclusion
Many observers interpret the World Bank initiative
to launch the CIFs, along with its overarching
Strategic Framework on Climate Change and
Development (SFCCD), as a move to position the
institution more widely in climate finance. The
establishment and management of the CIFs indicate
a shift in the World Bank away from ring-fenced
project finance to become a platform for pooled
resources (see Alexander 2010). The introduction
of loans into the climate finance sphere, supported
by recent advocacy from the EU6 to extend the role
of loans, generates a strong rationale for a lending
institution to take a central role in climate finance.
The core idea of mainstreaming adaptation into
development also embodied in the SFCCD maps
out a continued role for the World Bank in the
future of climate finance.
The CIFs and the PPCR have paved the way for a
longer-term shift in climate finance sources and
delivery mechanisms which establish a longer-
term role for the World Bank and the MDBs in
both financing and implementing mainstreamed
adaptation. These forms of finance shift the
landscape for action on the ground and further
frustrate the ability of those most vulnerable to
climate change impacts to shape future
adaptation funding flows.
The set-up of the CIFs within the World Bank as
a fund designed to engage MDBs reflects a top-
down and donor-driven process. The challenge to
deliver the PPCR within the timeframe imposed
by its sunset clause means that a focus on speed
and results has led to a lack of depth in certain
areas such as inclusive multi-stakeholder
ownership. This has been evident at both the
negotiation phase and through the implementing
modalities. This weak inclusion of developing
countries and civil society stakeholders in the
early phase design process limited their input
and led to a programme and structure more in
tune with the donor and MDB agenda than one
which seeks to respond to needs of the most
vulnerable and establish true country ownership.
Donors had a role to play at the international level of
the PPCR negotiations and were significant in
supporting change in the World Bank zero draft.
However, the overwhelming power has been
retained in the hands of the World Bank and the
MDBs both through the design phase and the early
implementation at the international level. At
country level, donors see themselves as having only
little opportunity to influence the negotiation or
implementation of the Strategic Program for Climate
Resilience (SPCR). It is at the country level that the
emphasis on the MDBs as implementing institutions
clearly shapes the direction of PPCR delivery.
A political economy analysis of the PPCR points
to the need for broader engagement of
vulnerable countries and Southern civil society in
the design process of global adaptation funding.
It highlights the need for clarity between general
climate resilience in development processes and
standalone adaptation. It also indicates the need
for greater harmonisation through a global
alignment of climate finance mechanisms to
promote and achieve climate adaptation that
identifies and enables the most vulnerable to
adapt.
Multi-stakeholder engagement grounded in
country-level realities can help to identify and
build on existing capacities at the national level.
This can help to improve the efficiency of
disbursing climate finance and to extend its
reach and response to those who are most
vulnerable. This echoes the calls for the Green
Climate Fund announced in Cancun to recognise
wider sector engagement in the design phase of
the funds as key to avoiding the ‘risk of sub-
optimal outcomes’ (Müller 2011: 2). It also
points to the need for increasing accountability
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and engagement at the national level around the
processes of negotiating, identifying and
prioritising investment opportunities by
strengthening the role for civil society in
decision-making processes. Developing
negotiation and decision-making spaces that
embrace a range of actors provides the
opportunity to navigate a multitude of ideologies
and lead towards a more balanced delivery and
reach of climate finance.
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Notes
* Research for this article was carried out
through the Political Economy of Low Carbon
Climate Resilient Development project,
coordinated by IDS and funded by the UK
Department for International Development
(DFID). The views expressed here are the views
of the authors and do not represent the views or
policies of IDS, DFID, or the UK government.
1 Many interviewees noted that the bulk of
attention was with the mitigation fund. It was
mainly the UK championing the adaptation
issue within the CIFs. The general bias towards
mitigation is also signalled by the level of donor
pledges between the Clean Technology Fund
(US$4.4bn) and PPCR (US$0.97bn) (as of
October 2010). See http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/
25.html and www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/
__g8-summit/ anlagen/chairs-summary,template
Id=raw, property=publication File.pdf/chairs-
summary.pdf (accessed 8 March 2011).
2 ‘We invest in the World Bank and the regional
development banks because they provide
strong, effective and highly leveraged means to
advance global prosperity while also promoting
core American interests and values’, Timothy
Geitner, written Testimony before the House
Committee on Appropriations, March 2010.
3 www.climatefundsupdate.org
4 For example, minutes from a meeting
between the UK’s DFID and the UK INGO
sector reflect the desire for the UK to
distance itself from the consultation draft,
www.bond.org.uk/data/files/resources/180/
8april08_dfid_ppcr_minutes.doc (accessed
29 March 2011).
5 This is an inherent trade-off also existing in
the aid effectiveness debate, where the
creation of dedicated funds including in
country decision-making based on affected
groups runs contrary to the call of the Paris
Declaration to reduce ‘fragmentation’ of
development assistance.
6 Guardian article: ‘Row Over EU Climate Loans
Policy’, 1 December, www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/dec/01/cancun-climate-
change-conference-loans (accessed 29 March
2011).
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